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THE REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST
COURTESY OF THE LOS ANGELES GOLF
CLUB - SECTIONS 856-858 OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE OF 1954
THOMAS G. CODY*
In 1921 James M. O'Brien and T. A. Morrissey made a decla-
ration of trust of certain Los Angeles real estate. The trust was
designated the "Los Angeles Golf Club." Morrissey and O'Brien,
as trustees of the trust, were authorized to do everything necessary
to operate the club. Little did these gentlemen realize the contribu-
tion they were about to make to the clarification of the predecessor
of section 7701(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. While
section 7701(a)(3) and its predecessor sections' include an "asso-
ciation" within the definition of "corporation," the Code has
remained silent as to what meaning is to be attributed to the word
"association." In 1935, the Supreme Court of the United States
filled this void with its decision in Morrissey v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue2 wherein the Court analyzed the nature of owner-
*Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; B.A. Maryknoll
College; J.D. 1967, St. John's University; member of the New York Bar.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 3797(a)(2); Revenue Act of 1932, § I II(a)(2); Revenue
Act of 1928, § 701(a)(2); Revenue Act of 1926, § 2(a)(2); Revenue Act of 1924, § 2(2)(2);
Revenue Act of 1921, § 2(2); Revenue Act of 1918, § 1; Revenue Act of 1917, § 200.
2. 296 U.S. 343 (1935). The Morrissey decision was the first of a series in which the
Supreme Court denied "pass-through" treatment to holders of transferable shares of benefi-
cial interest in trusts which acted as collective investment vehicles. The others (all decided
the same term) were Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 362 (1935) (trust created by co-
owners of an apartment building td manage, control, mortgage and otherwise deal with the
property held taxable as an association); Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365 (1935) (trust
created to finance and drill an oil well held taxable as an association); Helvering v.
Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U.S. 369 (1935) (trust created by owners of various apart-
ment buildings to own and operate the buildings held taxable as an association). The
Supreme Court had previously decided what the characteristics of a business trust were in
Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924). The business trust is, in substance:
[ . . [Ain arrangement whereby property is conveyed to trustees, in accordance with
the terms of an instrument of trust, to be held and managed for the benefit of such
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ship and operational structure of the Los Angeles Golf Club. Faced
with a situation involving the use of a trust as a vehicle for real
estate investment and development, the Court held that the test for
"association" was to be found in the attributes of a corporation.
Resemblance to a corporation would result in the "association"
being taxed as a corporation. After discussing the various attrib-
utes to be considered, 3 the Court held the trust in question to be
an association taxable as a corporation.
The immediate result of Morrissey was to mandate the double
taxation generally associated with the corporation for the business
trust. Consequently, it eliminated the possibility of a pass-through
approach whereby all, or substantially all, of the business trust's
income would, to the extent distributed, be taxed only at the benefi-
ciary level. This was the state of the law for slightly less than 25
years.'
Recognizing that the 1954 Code provided certain conduit treat-
ment for shareholders of regulated investment companies (so-
called "mutual funds"),5 the Congress, in 1960, considered legisla-
tion which would extend to holders of shares of beneficial interest
in real estate investment trusts substantially the same treatment for
federal income tax purposes previously afforded shareholders of
regulated investment companies. The Congress held this to be de-
sirable since:
persons as may from time to time be the holders of transferable certificates issued
by the trustees showing the shares into which the beneficial interest property is
divided.
Id. at 146-47.
3. 269 U.S. 343 at 359-60. The major attributes of a corporation may be summarized
as follows: (a) associates; (b) continuity of life; (c) an objective to carry on business and
divide the gains; (d) centralized management; (e) limited liability of shareholders; and (f)
free transferability of interests. These criteria, first enunciated in Morrissey, have been
spelled out in Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960).
4. Pass-through benefits were offered, however, to the shareholders of regulated invest-
ment companies during this period. Under §§ 361 and 362 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939
(presently found in §§ 851, 852 and 855 of the INT. REV. CODE of 1954), regulated invest-
ment companies, which include those entities commonly referred to as "mutual funds,"
could elect to be taxed only on undistributed income, this despite the fact that they were,
and are, taxable as corporations. See rfN. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 851 and 7701(a)(3); Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 361 and 3797(a)(3). More specifically, under present law, electing
regulated investment companies which (i) meet certain asset and income tests and (ii)
distribute at least 90 per cent of their ordinary income are taxed only on their retained
earnings. In addition, shareholders are entitled to a credit for any capital gains taxes paid
by the company. An attempt in 1956 to enact legislation addressed to real estate investment
trusts failed when President Eisenhower vetoed B.R. 4392, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), in
his veto message of August 19, 1956, 102 CONG. REc. 15304 (1956).
5. Id.
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S. . [I]n both cases [regulated investment companies and real
estate investment trusts] the methods of investment constitute
pooling arrangements whereby small investors can secure advan-
tages normally available only to those with larger resources.
These advantages include the spreading of the risk of loss by the
greater diversification of investment which can be secured
through the pooling arrangement; the opportunity to secure the
benefits of expert investment counsel; and the means of collec-
tively financing projects which the investors could not undertake
singly.6
It was felt that tax-wise this equalization of treatment would secure
"for the trust beneficiaries the same type of tax treatment they
would receive if they held -the real estate equities and mortgages
directly."'7
With these purposes in mind Congress, in 1960, added sections
856, 857 and 858 to the Internal Revenue Code. In substance, these
sections provide that a qualifying and electing real estate invest-
ment trust (REIT) shall be exempt from corporate taxess on in-
come which is distributed to its shareholders. Qualification for this
treatment is based on satisfying requirements as to (a) amount of
income distributed;9 (b) composition of assets; 10 and (c) sources of
income." In essence, the trust will have to distribute 90 percent of
its so-called "real estate investment trust taxable income,"' 2 invest
primarily in real estate and mortgages," and derive the major
portion of its income from such real estate and mortgages.
I. SECTION 856-DEFINITION OF A REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT
TRUST
A. General Definition
Section 856(a)(1) of the Code defines a real estate investment
6. H.R. REP. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960).
7. Id.
8. Section I 1 of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 imposes a 22 % "normal tax" on the first
$25,000 of corporate taxable income and a 48 % tax (22 % normal tax plus a 26 % surtax)
on taxable income in excess of $25,000. By reason of§ 11 (e) of the 1954 Code, this corporate
tax in inapplicable to REITs which are subject to the provisions of §§ 856 to 858 of the 1954
Code.
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(a)(1).
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(5).
1I. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(2)-(4).
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(a)(1).
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(5).
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(2)-(4).
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trust as "an unincorporated association" which:"5
(1) would be taxable as a corporation absent sections 856-
858;16
(2) is managed by one or more trustees;
(3) has transferable shares or certificates of beneficial inter-
est;
(4) does not hold any property primarily for sale in the ordi-
nary course of business;
(5) has 100 or more persons holding beneficial (as opposed to
record) interests;
(6) does not have fewer than six individuals owning more than
50 percent in value of the outstanding stock of the REIT;17 and
(7) meets the income, asset and income distribution tests of
section 856(c). The characteristics specified in subparagraphs (1),
(2), (3) and (4) above must be met during the entire taxable year
in question, while that set out in subparagraph (5) must be satisfied
during at least 355 days of that taxable year.18 While certain of the
components of the definition are clear, 9 others require clarifica-
tion.
B. Management by the Trustees
Section 856(a)(1) requires the REIT be "managed by one or
more trustees." In effect, this requires that the trustees have the
exclusive authority to make the management decisions necessary
to the business operations of the REIT.2 1 This is to be distinguished
15. Since the "conduit" treatment offered qualifying and electing REITs is provided
solely by statute, strict adherence to its provisions is absolutely necessary. The failure to
qualify can lead to immediate and disastrous consequences. The REIT will lose its "pass-
through" character and will be subject to tax as a corporation. A tax will be payable on
the same income both at the corporate and shareholder levels. If a trust is disqualified after
successfully qualifying for several years, it will have distributed most if not all of its income.
Consequently, it could be in the unenviable position of having to liquidate investments to
meet its corporate tax liability.
16. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1054 § 7701(a)(3) and (a)(4); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 and
-4 (1960); Morrissey v. Commissioner, note 2, supra.
17. Section 856(a)(6) of the 1954 Code provides that an organization does not meet the
definitional requirements if it "would be a personal holding company (as defined in § 542)
if all its adjusted ordinary gross income (as defined in § 543(b)(2)) constituted personal
holding company income (as defined in § 543) .. "
18. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(b); Treas. Regs. § 1.856-l(c) (1962). A proportionate
part of the year is used if the taxable year is less than twelve months.
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(2)(transferable shares); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 856(a)(3) (association taxable as a corporation); INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(5) (100
or more beneficial owners); and INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(6) (personal holding
company provisions).
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(d)(1) (1962).
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from the ordinary concept of the trustee of an inter vivos or testa-
mentary trust where the trustee takes title to the property in trust
but solely "for the purpose of protecting or conserving it for the
beneficiaries under the ordinary rules applied in chancery or pro-
bate courts."' 2' The result of this requirement is that the trustees
of an REIT must satisfy the "centralization of management" test
set out by section 301.7701-2(c) of the Treasury Regulations.2
Realizing the enormous financial impact a failure to qualify as
a REIT will have on the trust,2 and conceding that it is conse-
quently essential that the REIT scrupulously observe each of the
various criteria of section 856(a), the question arises as to what
powers can remain in hands of the holders of shares of beneficial
interest without risking a finding that the trustees are not manag-
ing the business? There has been a dearth of authoritative interpre-
tation on this statutory requirement. The regulations and a few
published revenue rulings offer some assistance. In section 1.856-
l(d)(1) of the regulations, the Treasury states that certain powers
may be left to the shareholders. Noting that the following are
merely meant to be examples of permissible retained powers, the
regulation states that the requisite continuing exclusive authority
of the trustees will still exist:
21. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (1960).
22. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1960) provides in relevant part:
Centralization of Management. (1) An organization has centralized management
if any person (or any group of persons which does not include all the members) has
continuing exclusive authority to make the management decisions necessary to the
conduct of the business for which the organization was formed. Thus, the persons
who are vested with such management authority resemble in powers and functions
the directors of a statutory corporation ...
(2) The persons who have such authority may, or may not, be members of the
organization and may hold office as a result of a selection by the members from time
to time, or may be self perpetuating in office. See Morrissey v. Commissioner 296
U.S. 344 (1935) [36-1 USTC 190201. Centralized management can be accomplished
by election to office, by proxy appointment, or by any other means which has the
effect of concentrating in a management group continuing exclusive authority to
make management decisions.
(3) Centralized management means a concentration of continuing exclusive au-
thority to make independent business decisions on behalf of the organization which
do not require ratification by members of such organization. Thus, there is not
certralized management when the centralized authority is merely to perform minis-
terial acts as an agent at the direction of a principal.
(4) There is no centralization of continuing exclusive authority to make manage-
ment decisions, unless the managers have sole authority to make such decisions. For
example, in the case of a corporation or a trust, the concentration of management
powers in a board of directors or trustees effectively prevents a stockholder or a trust
beneficiary, from binding the corporation or the trust by his acts. ...
23. See notes 8 and 15, supra.
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. . . [E]ven though the trust instrument grants to the sharehold-
ers any or all of the following rights and powers: To elect or
remove trustees; to terminate the trust; and to ratify amendments
to the trust instrument proposed by the trustee.
Additional examples 24 of these permissible retained powers are
found in Revenue Ruling 70-569.21 There, tfie declaration of trust
endowed the trustees with very broad management powers over the
assets and affairs of the REIT. In addition, the declaration specifi-
cally conferred the following rights on the holders of shares of
beneficial interest:
(1) the right to approve or refuse to approve an increase in
the rate of the trust adviser's compensation;
(2) the right to approve or refuse to approve any proposed
merger of the trust into another organization; and
(3) the right to approve or refuse to approve any sale or other
transfer of substantially all of the property of the trust."8 Without
stating any reasons for its decision, the Internal Revenue Service
ruled that these rights did not violate the requirement of section
856(a)(1) that the trust be managed by one or more trustees.
In the same vein as the question of how much control may be
retained by the REIT shareholders is the concern as to how much
authority the trustees can delegate without risking disqualification
on the ground that they are not managing the trust as required by
section 856(a)(1). The Internal Revenue Service has focused on this
issue and has ruled that:
• . . [T]rustees have powers similar to those possessed by direc-
24. Rev. Rul. 64-259, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 180, merely applies the examples set out in
Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(d)(1) to certain provisions of a trust instrument which were substan-
tially identical to those set out in the regulations.
25. 1970-2 CUM. BULL. 147.
26. The facts posited in this ruling were as follows:
P, an unincorporated trust, otherwise qualifying as a real estate investment trust
under § 856 of the Code, has an agreement with an advisory company under which
the company advises the trust with respect to investments and investment policy and
administers the day-to-day operation of the trust, subject to the supervision of the
trustees of the trust. Under a delegation of authority from the trustees, the company
is authorized to make loan commitments and investments on behalf of the trust up
to a specific amount, subject to the policies and guidelines set forth in the declaration
of trust. Loans above the specific amounts must be approved by the trustees. The
trustees retain all other continuing exclusive authority to manage the trust. The
delegation of authority, which is for an initial term of two years, is permitted under
applicable state law and is subject to approval of the shareholders. It may be termi-
nated by the trustees upon 60-day notice. 1972-1 CUM. BULL. at 207.
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tors of a corporation and since the board of directors of a corpo-
ration generally has the power to delegate discretionary power
to an agent, the trustees of a real estate investment trust possess
the same power."
By way of analogy, the resemblance of corporate directors and
REIT trustees can be extended to the shareholder-retained power
issue. The permissible retained powers found in the regulation cited
and revenue ruling discussed are limited in scope. Considered in
context, however, it would seem permissible to conclude that those
powers and rights normally held by corporate shareholders could
also be retained by holders of shares of beneficial interest without
substantial risk of disqualification. 8
C. Active Business Prohibition
Congress, in considering the merits of adding the REIT provi-
sions to the Code, emphasized that there was no intent to provide
conduit treatment to those organizations which were no different,
except as to product, from the conventional business organization.
The benefits of REIT treatment were to be restricted to those
trusts which were organized for the investment pooling arrange-
ments originally contemplated by the Congress. 29 The Report of
the House Committee on Ways and Means contains the following
language:
. . . [Y]our committee has. . . taken care to draw a sharp line
between passive investments and the active operation of business,
and has extended the regulated investment company type of tax
treatment only to income from the passive investments of real
estate investment trusts. Your committee believes that any real
estate investment trust engaging in active business operations
should continue to be subject to the corporate tax in the same
manner as is true in the case of similar operations carried on by
other comparable enterprises. 0
Reflecting this objective, section 856(a)(4) bars favorable treat-
ment for a trust which holds "any property primarily for sale in
the ordinary course of business." Before discussing the application
27. Rev. Rul. 72-254, 1972-1 Cum. BULL. 207-08.
28. Unfortunately, the use of the word "normally" automatically implies a question of
fact. As a result, in view of the consequences of a failure to qualify, a private ruling should
be sought from the Internal Revenue Service before adding any retained powers other than
those previously sanctioned by the regulations or published revenue rulings.
29. See text accompanying note 6, supra.
30. See note 6, supra.
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of this provision, it must be noted that the Code refers to any
property. As a result, disqualification is not dependent upon a
finding that the trust holds all or substantially all its property as
inventory, but can occur whenever the trust is deemed to hold a
single fee interest, a single mortgage, or a single lease for sale in
the ordinary course of business.
Regulations in effect urfder section 856(a)(4), those proposed
and a recent revenue ruling delineate the stringent nature of this
provision. Section 1.856-1(d)(4) of the regulations provides:
A real estate investment trust may not hold any property primar-
ily for sale in the ordinary course of its trade or business.
Whether property is held for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of the trade or business of a real estate investment trust
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
A recent ruling indicates the depth of the concern that the meaning
of this provision has created. In Revenue Ruling 72-229,31 the
Internal Revenue Service was asked to determine whether the
"property primarily for sale" test would be met if a REIT issued
its own commercial paper in the form of promissory notes. The
Service concluded that since the REIT itself was merely borrowing
money from those who purchased the notes, the trust was not
holding property primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business. It was conspicuously noted in the ruling that
the bank which acted as the trust's selling agent had "no liability
for payment of the notes and is not accountable for the collectibil-
ity, validity or enforceability of any check delivered in payment for
the notes and has no liability in connection with the notes. 32
Two observations are appropriate. First, the mere fact of
applying for a ruling in connection with this financing practice
illustrates the concern of the trust's management to avoid, if possi-
ble, any risk of running afoul of the section 856(a)(4) test. Sec-
ondly, and perhaps more significantly, the reliance placed on the
absence of an independent or joint obligation on the part of the
agent bank illustrates the danger of inadvertent disqualification. A
joint or independent obligation of the agent bank could, it appears,
have created "property" solely for sale to the public and resulted
in disqualification.
One of the "property primarily for sale" problems which has
31. 1972-I CuM. BULL. 206.
32. Id. at 207.
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caused great concern to trusts attempting to qualify under the
section 856 definition is that generated by the sale of mortgage
participations. Assume, for example, that a builder approaches a
trust with a request for a $50,000,000 loan to be secured by a
mortgage on real property. Assume further that the trust is unable
(because of restrictions in its declaration of trust) or unwilling to
commit for and fund the entire $50,000,000. What options are
available to it? Clearly, if the trust merely agrees to lend a portion
of the amount requested and then finds other lenders who will take
up the balance, no problem should exist. Equally clear is the situa-
tion where the trust lends the $50,000,000 intending to sell partici-
pations in the loan after closing. Here the trust does hold property
and that property is held as inventory at least to the extent of the
participations. A subsequent sale would probably disqualify the
trust. But what if the trust does lend the entire $50,000,000 and
several years later, because better investments become available,
sells or "lays-off' a part of the loan? Until very recently, there was
no published answer to this question.
In Revenue Ruling 73-398, 3 the Internal Revenue Service
replied that where the trust has no history of portfolio sales and
no intent to engage in further selling, their investment policy hav-
ing resulted in a severe portfolio imbalance and such imbalance has
affected its access to additional funding sources a sale may be
made. Under these circumstances, to dispose of several long-term
mortgages to balance its investments will not result in a finding
that the mortgages were held primarily for sale within the meaning
of section 856(a)(4). Concededly, the ruling is of limited value as
precedent in situations other than that described. Nevertheless, it
does indicate a realistic attitude on the part of the Service when
faced with the facts of business life with which the trust must deal
such as changes in market conditions, sources of funding and the
like.
On December 7, 1972, the Treasury published certain proposed
regulations wherein it included several examples of what was
meant by the limitation on property held for sale in the ordinary
course of business.34 Section 1.856-1(d)(4) of the Proposed Trea-
33. 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 39, at 14.
34. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(d)(4), 37 Fed. Reg. 26014 (1972), includes in exam-
ple (1) the factual statements that the condominium is "listed with a broker for sale as an
individual unit" and is "sold to an unrelated party within a reasonable period of time."
(Emphasis added) As a result, the examples, which apparently attempt to describe certain
1974]
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sury Regulations contains two examples, both of which indicate the
Service considers that: (1) when Congress said "any property" it
means "any", and (2) a trust acts at its peril when it does any more
than attempt to protect its investment in, or reduce its loss with
respect to, a particular asset. The proposed regulation provides in
relevant part:
Example (1). Trust M, which otherwise qualifies as a real estate
investment trust, has in its portfolio a construction loan for a
condominium (single multi-unit dwelling). The loan originated
with the trust and was made in accordance with prudent lending
practices. The security for the loan is a mortgage on the condom-
inium. After completion of the construction of the condominium,
the debtor defaults on the loan and the trust becomes the owner
of the condominium as a result of a foreclosure sale. The com-
dominium is listed with a broker for sale as an undivided unit.
The condominium is sold to an unrelated party within a reason-
able period of time after foreclosure of the mortgage. . . . [T]he
trust is not considered to have held the condominium primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or busi-
ness merely because of the circumstances under which the fore-
closure was made and the property was sold.
Example (2). The facts are the same as in Example (1), except
that, at the time the trust obtains ownership of the condominium,
the construction . . is 80 percent completed . . . and the trust
employs an unrelated contractor to complete construction of the
condominium.
. . . [T]he trust is not considered to have held the condominium
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade
or business merely because of the circumstances under which the
foreclosure was made and the property was sold.
Both of these examples acknowledge that a REIT, to avoid
disqualification, need not conduct a "fire sale" whenever it be-
comes the owner of the property securing its loan. The examples
transactions which will be "safe," raise several additional and less than obvious questions.
Will a trust which accepts the security in satisfaction of the debt without instituting foreclo-
sure proceedings be barred from relying on example (I)? If a building were 79% complete,
or 51% complete at the time of foreclosure, could any reliance be placed on example (2)?
In substance, must a trust literally fit within the examples in order not only to rely but also
to avoid the possibility of an agent interpreting them as definitive guidelines as to when a
trust will and when it will not satisfy section 856(a)(4)? A more complete discussion of these
problems is found in Berenson & Reichler, The Proposed REIT Regulations: A Critique,
73 THE TAX ADVISER 282 (1973). These commentators characterize the clarifying effect of
the proposed regulations as follows: "We believe that the mountain has labored long and
brought forth a mouse." Id. at 283.
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similarly indicate, however, that even though a sale as an entirety
might produce less income than a sale in units, the REIT must
nonetheless avoid holding the property as inventory.
The narrowness which the Service views the "primarily for
sale" requirement mandates that a trust and its counsel think at
least twice before planning any investment program which could
(because of portfolio turnover) be viewed as including inventory
among its investments.
D. Income and Asset Requirements
Assuming that the trust has satisfied the definitional require-
ments of subdivisions (1) to (6) of section 856(a), it must still meet
the income and asset composition tests of section 856(c)35 before
it can qualify to elect REIT treatment.
1. Income Test
There are two positive and one negative income tests. The 75
percent income test36 provides that at least 75 percent of the trust's
gross income 37 must be income related to real property. This in-
cludes: (i) rents from real property; (ii) interest on obligations
secured by mortgages on real property; (iii) gain from the sale or
other disposition of real property;38 (iv) dividends and other distri-
butions from, and gains from the sale or other disposition of shares
of other qualifying and electing REITs; 39 and (v) abatements and
refunds of taxes on real property.
Under the 90 percent income test" an additional 15 percent of
the trust's gross income must be derived from: (i) any of the
sources satisfying the 75 percent test; (ii) dividends; (iii) interest;
and (iv) gains from the sale of stock or securities."
The third test, the 30 percent income test requires not more
than 30 percent of the trust's gross income may be attributable to:
(i) sales or other dispositions of stock or securities held for less
than six months; and (ii) sales or other dispositions of real property
35. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(7).
36. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(3).
37. Ir. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a) defines gross income as". . . all income [other
than that specifically excluded] from whatever source derived..
38. This does not mean that the "property primarily for sale" prohibition of§ 856(a)(4)
is waived if the property involved is real property. Section 856(c) is merely setting forth
requirements as to the permissible "mix" of income and assets.
39. Section 856 of the 1954 Code permits a trust to qualify and elect REIT treatment
even if its sole asset and source of income is shares of other qualified and electing REITs.
40. Ir. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(2).
41. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(4).
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and interests in real property held for less than four years."
2. Asset Test
The following composition of assets must exist at the close of
each quarter of the taxable year under the 75 percent asset test.
4 3
At least 75 percent of the total value 4  of the assets of the trust must
be attributable to: (i) real estate assets; (ii) cash and cash items
(including receivables); and (iii) government securities.
The 25 percent asset test" provides that at the close of each
quarter: (i) not more than 25 percent of the trust's assets may be
composed of securities not includable in the 75 percent test above;46
and (ii) with respect to the securities included in this 25 percent test
not more than 5 percent of the value of the trust's total assets may
be invested in securities of any one issuer, nor may the trust own
more than 10 percent of the voting securities of such issuer 7
A change in the value of various assets will not in itself cause
the 75 percent or 25 percent tests to be failed. However, a security
purchase made after value fluctuations have occurred can only be
42. Gross income attributable to real property (or interests in real property which is
"compulsory, or involuntarily converted," as that phrase is used in § 1033 of the 1954 Code)
is not to be taken into account in applying this 30% test. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
856(c)(4)(B).
43. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(5)(A).
44. For purposes of §§ 856 to 858, "value" is defined as follows:
The term 'value' means, with respect to securities for which market quotations are
readily available, the market value of such securities; and with respect to other
securities and assets, fair value as determined in good faith by the trustees, except
that in the case of securities of real estate investment trusts such fair value shall not
exceed market value or asset value, whichever is higher.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(6)(A).
45. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(5)(B).
46. This limitation does not apply to shares of other qualified and electing REITs.
Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(c) (1962) provides that the term "securities" does not "include 'in-
terests in real property' or 'real estate assets' as those terms are defined, in § 856. ...
"Section 856(c)(6)(B) of the Code and § 1.856-3(b) of the Regulations include shares of
other qualified and electing REITs within the meaning of real estate assets. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.856-3(0 (1962) contains a definition of "qualified real estate investment trusts."
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(d)(4) (1962) contains an example of a trust which, while
satisfying the 75 % test, fails the 25 % test:
Example (2). Real Estate Investment Trust P, at the close of the first quarter




Real Estate Assets 63
Securities of Corporation Z 20
Securities of Corporation X 4
TOTAL 100
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made when these tests are satisfied after taking the fluctuations
into account. The same principle applies to the 5 percent test con-
tained in the 25 percent test.48
E. Specific Items to be Considered in Applying the Income Tests
While the application of the asset composition test is fairly
straightforward, there are several problems arising in connection
with the income tests.
1. Rents from Real Property
As a general rule, the term "rents from real property" refers
to the price paid to use real property owned by the trust. Unfortun-
ately, as is the case with many sections of the Code, more emphasis
must be placed on and concern shown for the exceptions added to
this general rule.
Both real and personal property rented by the trust. Where a
trust receives gross income with respect to the use of both real and
personal property only the amount paid with respect to the real
property can be used to satisfy the 75 percent test.49
Rents dependent on the income or profits of any person.
Amounts received as rent which are determined wholly or partially
by reference to the income or profits derived by the lessee from the
property do not qualify as "rents from real property."5 This bar
does not extend to those rents which are based on a percentage of
the lessee's gross receipts or gross sales.5' The difficulty with the
provision disqualifying income-based rent is not the theory under
which it arises but its practical application. The incentive to partic-
ipate in the lessee's business which profit participation can offer,
would seem to justify barring these amounts. However, the appli-
cation of the principle in the regulations indicates a certain incon-
sistency in approach. Under regulation section 1.856-4(b)(1) rent
which is a fixed amount qualifies. Rent which is based on income
or profits does not. But what if the rental amount is based on a
Trust P meets the requirement of § 856(c)(5)(A) since at least 75 percent of the value
of the total assets is represented by cash, government securities, and real estate
assets. However, Trust P does not meet the diversification requirements of §
856(c)(5)(B) because its investment in the voting securities of Corporation Z exceeds
5 % of the value of the trust's total assets.
48. INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(5); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(d)(3) (1962).
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(a) (1962). Such would be the case where the trust owned and
rented a furnished apartment building.




combination of both fixed and profit-sharing amounts? Is the sum
tainted? The regulations provide an unequivocal "it depends!"
Where in accordance with the terms of an agreement an amount
received or accrued as rent for the taxable year includes both a
fixed rental and a percentage of the lessee's income or profits in
excess of a specific amount . . . neither the fixed rental nor the
additional rent will qualify as 'rents from real property.' 2
This would seem logical in view of the language of section
856(d)(1). What if the trust, pursuant to this formula of fixed rent
plus a percentage of profits, determines that in fact this year's rent
is to be merely the fixed amount since the necessary profit level was
not reached by the lessee? Logically, the fixed rent should also be
disqualified since it was a part of a total package which included
a profit component. The mere absence of profits in one year should
be irrelevant if the purpose of the section is to isolate the trust from
an incentive to participate in the lessee's business. This is not the
case. Section 1.856-4(b)(1) of the regulations continues, "However,
where the amount received or accrued for the taxable year under
such an agreement includes only the fixed rental. . . such amount
may qualify as 'rents from real property'.""3 The proposed regula-
tions leave this distinction intact.5 4
Trust ownership of the person from whom it receives rent.
Rents from real property do not include any amount which is
accrued or received by the trust from a person or corporation in
which it has a 10 percent or more interest.55
Trust must furnish services and manage property only through
an independent contractor. Section 856(d)(3) provides in relevant
part that "rents from real property" does not include "any amount
received or accrued, directly or indirectly, with respect to any real
property, if the real estate investment trust furnishes or renders
services to the tenants of such property, or manages or operates
such property, other than through an independent contractor from
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(1) (1962).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(1) also points out that an inadvertent tainting of rents can
occur where the trust leases property on an otherwise qualified percentage of gross receipts
basis. If the tenant subleases all or a part of the property on a percentage of profits basis,
the entire rent paid by the first lessee to the trust is tainted. As a result, trust counsel, in
drafting the lease should bar its lessee from subleasing in any way which would cause rental
payments to fail the "rents from real property" test.
54. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(1), 37 Fed. Reg. 26014 (1972).
55. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d)(2).
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whom the trust itself does not derive or receive any income."56 This
provision, which again reflects the Congressional concern that the
trust be an investor and not an entrepreneur, effectively bars the
trust from any direct or indirect operation of its own property.
Though apparently lacking authority in the Code, the regula-
tions add a further complication by distinguishing between "serv-
ices . . . usually or customarily furnished or rendered in connec-
tion with the mere rental of real property"57 and "services other
than those usually or customarily rendered. . . ."I' The regula-
tions provide that where customary services" are performed for
tenants of the trust's real property, the cost of these services may
be taken up by the trust and, insofar as the rent includes them, may
be charged back to the tenants. In this case, no apportionment is
required to be made between the actual real property rental
amount and the amount representing payment for these services.
On the other hand, where the services are not customary," the trust
cannot absorb their cost. The entire cost must be separately billed
for and absorbed by the independent contractor, and the amounts
must be received and kept by the independent contractor.6 If the
requirements are not literally met, or an "erroneous" determina-
tion of what is customary is made, the total rent received is ex-
cluded from the "rents from real property" category.
56. Section 856(d)(3) of the 1954 Code defines an independent contractor as:
(A) a person who does not own, directly or indirectly, more than 35 % of the
shares, or certificates of beneficial interest, in the real estate investment trust, or
(B) a person, if a corporation, not more than 35 % of the total combined voting
power of whose stock (or 35 % of the total shares of all classes of whose stock), or,
if not a corporation, not more than 35 % of the interest in whose assets or net profits
is owned, directly or indirectly, by one or more persons owning 35 % or more of the
shares or certificates of beneficial interest in the trust.
The section concludes by adding that in applying the 35 % test, the constructive ownership
rules of § 318 are to be applied with one modification - the 50 % tests of § 318 are to be
replaced by a 10% test.
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(3)(i)(b) (1962).
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(3)(i)(c) (1962).
59. The regulation provides certain examples of what might be "customary services"
depending upon the circumstances. This should be contrasted with non-customary services
as to which the Treasury provides examples of what definitely are not customary. See note
60, infra. The result (and this is perpetuated by the Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.856-
4(b)(3)(i)(b), 37 Fed. Reg. 26014 (1972)) is to set up two categories - perhaps and absolutely
not. Examples of services which may or may not be customary are: the supplying of water,
heat and light; the cleaning of windows, exits and public entrances; trash collections; eleva-
tor service; answering service; unattended parking lots and the like.
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(3)(i)(c) (1962) lists the following as non-customary services:
hotel, maid, boarding house, motel, attended parking lot, warehouse or storage services.
61. See note 58, supra.
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2. Interest on Obligations Secured by Mortgages on Real Prop-
erty or Interests in Real Property
An interest on obligations secured by mortgages on real estate
qualifies in determining whether the 75 percent gross income test
has been met.12 No other type of interest qualifies. 3 While the
Code does no more than state that such interest must be mortgage-
related, the regulations, several rulings and the facts of REIT life
have given rise to a variety of questions as to the application of
this critical test. The majority of these questions arise in connec-
tion with direct charges by and/or borrower reimbursement to the
trust for the expenses incurred by the trust in connection with its
financing transactions. 4 Discussed below are some of the more
frequently encountered problems in this area of "good", or 75
percent test, interest.
Legal interest. Section 1.856-2(c)(2)(ii) of the regulations bars
all but "lawful interest" from meeting the 75 percent test. Conse-
quently, usurious or otherwise illegal interest does not qualify.
Obviously, this can create substantial risks for a trust whose fi-
nancing activities extend into many jurisdictions. The statutory
and theoretical basis for this interpretation is less than clear. 5
Although this provision has been omitted in the proposed regula-
tions as published, 6 a trust while awaiting their final promulgation
must still run the risk that a loan's interest may be usurious and
unqualified for the 75 percent test. It is understood that the Inter-
nal Revenue Service's informal position is that only the illegal
portion of the interest fails to qualify.
Interest on a note secured by a mortgage on both real and
personal property. The regulations require (as is the case with
62. Section 856(c)(6)(C) of the 1954 Code defines the term "interests in real property"
as including "fee ownership and co-ownership of land or improvements thereon and lease-
holds of land or improvements thereon, but does not include mineral, oil, or gas royalty
interests."
63. Other types of interest do qualify for the 90% test of § 856(c)(2).
64. See Mirsky and Auerbach, The Mortgage REIT. An Analysis of Some Current
Income Tax Problems, 35 J. TAXATION 226 (1971); See also Carroll, Tax Policy for the
Real Estate Investment Trusts, 28 TAX L. REV. 299, 311 (1973).
65. One commentator feels much more strongly, stating:
The provision of section 1.856-2(c)(2)(ii) of the regulations that "usurious or illegal
interest" on a real estate mortgage, is so wrong it would be amusing if less were at
stake or if it were possible to say with assurance what is and what is not usurious
under the bewildering variety of statutes and decisions on that question.
Carroll, Tax Policy for the Real Estate Investment Trusts, 28 TAX L. REv. 299, 309, n.29
(1973).
66. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(c)(2)(ii), 37 Fed. Reg. 26014 (1972).
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rents) that an apportionment be made where a loan is secured by
both real and personal property. Until the proposed regulations
were published, the regulations were silent as to how this appor-
tionment should be made. Under the proposed regulations, if the
loan value of the realty equals or exceeds the amount of the bor-
rowing and equals or exceeds the loan value of the other property
securing the loan, the interest will be apportioned entirely to the
realty. 7 The interest will therefore qualify in full for the 75 percent
test. For example, if a trust lends $25,000,000 to a corporation
which owns and operates a chain of hotels, the loan being secured
by a mortgage on the corporation's land, buildings and chattels,
the interest paid will qualify for the 75 percent test if the owner's
equity in the land and buildings is at least $25,000,000 and the value
of the chattels is less than that amount. If, on the other hand, the
value of the chattels were $30,000,000, and the value of the land
and buildings $24,000,000, the interest would be apportioned in its
entirety to the personal property. As a result, none of the interest
would qualify for the 75 percent test.6" Finally, if the relative loan
values of the real property and the chattels do not cause the trans-
action to fall within either of these two alternatives, the interest
income is to be apportioned on the basis of the relative values of
the real and personal property."
Interest dependent wholly or partially on the income or profits
of another person. As noted above,70 the term "rent from real
property" does not include any rent which is based in whole or in
part on a lessee's (or sublessee's) profits or income. The regulation
establishing this "tainting"7' has specific support in the Code.72 In
the proposed regulations, 73 the "taint" has been extended to inter-
est income which is determined by the borrower's income or profit
picture. There is not statutory authority for this approach to inter-
est and, in fact, the statute introduces this limitation only with
respect to rents. If the new limitation is the result of the Treasury's
fear that the absence of this limit is a loophole permitting a trust's
indirect involvement in the business of its borrowers, it would seem
67. Id.
68. Id. The disqualified interest would, however, qualify for the 90% test of § 856(c)(2)
of the Code.
69. Id.
70. See text accompanying note 50, supra.
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(1) (1962).
72. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d)(1).
73. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(c)(2)(ii), 37 Fed. Reg. 26014 (1972).
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that the general active business prohibition which permeates sec-
tion 856 is a sufficient deterrent given the disastrous consequences
of disqualification.74
Guaranteed interest; temporary purchases of mortgages. As-
sume that Bank A has loaned $25,000,000 to X, a corporate bor-
rower, at an interest rate of 8 percent. The loan is secured by a
mortgage on real property. Assume further that, at a later date,
for valid business reasons, the bank would like to reduce this in-
vestment. Trust B, an otherwise qualified and electing REIT, is
willing to "buy" $10,000,000 of this loan but only if it can receive
interest at an effective rate of 9 percent. Two options are available.
If Trust B merely purchases $10,000,000 of the loan and Bank A
agrees to share the interest received on the mortgage in a manner
which will guarantee Trust B a yield of 9 percent, the interest
should qualify whether it is treated as interest or market discount.
Suppose, however, that Bank A guarantees that the trust shall
receive no less than 9 percent. In the alternative, suppose that the
bank does not wish to part forever with this investment, but merely
wishes to remove a portion of it from its portfolio for a limited
time. The answer is based on another question as to who is the
borrower-in-fact. Is it really interest on a loan secured by real
property or is it a loan to Bank A which is secured by Bank A's
assets, the notes and mortgages which it continues to own? If the
answer is the latter, the interest, since it is not based on a real
property transaction, fails the 75 percent test although it will qual-
ify as other interest for the 90 percent test.7"
Points. Revenue Ruling 70-54078 defines "points" as follows:
The term "points" . . . refers to a charge made by the lender to
the borrower, which is in addition to the stated annual interest
rate, and is paid by the borrower to the lender as an adjustment
of the stated interest to reflect the actual cost of borrowing
money. The amount of "points" charged is determined by the
lender upon consideration of the factors that usually dictate an
acceptable rate of interest. Thus "points" ... are for the use or
74. See note 15, supra.
75. Situations where the seller intends to "buy back" the participation is what is gener-
ally called a "warehousing" transaction. In effect, the seller is saying: "Look, I need some
funds for a limited period of time. You lend me the money and hold these assets of mine
as your collateral. After the need passes, I'll buy it back." See Special Ruling, June 18,
1963, 637 CCH 6559 where the Internal Revenue Service privately ruled that such interest
qualifies only for the 90% test.
76. 1970-2 CuM. BULL. 101.
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forbearance of money and are considered to be interest." (Em-
phasis added.)
While the Service's position that points are "good" interest for
the 75 percent test is reasonably straightforward, two problems
remain. If the points are to be paid at a certain date prior to the
closing, there is a substantial question as to whether the income is
generated by an obligation secured by a mortgage on real prop-
erty.78 Prior to closing, there is no loan; there is no obligation; there
is no mortgage. There is at least cause for concern that the income
will not be interest for the 75 percent test, but rather will be viewed
as a non-qualified commitment fee.79 Consequently, a trust would
be well advised to structure its receipt of points either at the closing
or at a time so near to closing that it is in fact part of the process
of closing.
A second problem involves a question of when the points are
to be included in the REIT's gross income - a matter which can
be of some importance in determining whether the trust has distrib-
uted 90 percent of its real estate investment trust taxable income."
Assume that Trust X had agreed to lend $1,000,000 to a certain
borrower and will charge one point or $10,000. Two methods are
available for collecting the $10,000. The trust and the borrower can
exchange checks at the closing (the "gross points" approach) or the
trust can deliver a check for $990,000 and receive back the bor-
rower's note for $1,000,000 (the "net points" approach). Using the
gross points approach results in the trust including the amount
when received as a cash basis taxpayer or when the right to receive
is fixed as an accrual basis taxpayer." If the net points approach
is adopted, the trust must include the points in gross income rata-
bly over the period during which payments on the note are due.82
Miscellaneous receipts: commitment fees; good faith deposits;
legal appraisal, title insurance, recording, credit inspection and
similar fees. A commitment fee is a charge for promising to hold
funds for the borrower. It is not interest for either the 75 percent
77. A "point" is equal to 1% of the amount borrowed and is paid normally at closing.
78. See Rev. Rul. 56-136, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 92 which provides that the indebtedness
must be funded before "points" will constitute interest.
79. It is understood that this is the unpublished position of the Internal Revenue Service.
See Klein, Tax Problems of Mortgage Investment Trusts, THE MORTGAGE BANKER 23
(Oct., 1971).
80. See text accompanying note 91, infra.




or 90 percent tests. As a result it is included in the 10 percent
basket clause for all bad or tainted income. A commitment fee
need not be called a fee. If the potential lender is charging for the
availability of funds, the amount will retain its taint and not be
"good" interest.8 3 For example, if in February X Trust agrees to
lend a developer $500,000 in June and assesses a non-refundable
point regardless of the ultimate completion of the transaction, that
$5,000 charge is a commitment fee.
Normally, when a potential borrower approaches a trust to
apply for a loan, the borrower's application will be accompanied
by a check representing an application fee for the loan or a good
faith deposit. Questions arise as to the treatment of this amount.
Clearly, if the trust receives the funds and has no obligation to
refund them, the trust has gross income at that time. Just as evi-
dent is the fact that this amount is not paid for the use of borrowed
funds and therefore does not qualify as interest for either the 75
percent or 90 percent tests. Recalling that these tests are based on
gross income,84 it is unavailing if the trust agrees to refund the
deposit in the event the loan closes. The trust has complete domin-
ion and control over the funds and would have gross income when
received. The potential repayment, even in the same tax year,
would do no more than create a deduction when repayment occurs.
The deduction, of course, is irrelevant in determining gross income.
Two options are open to a trust seeking to avoid this tainted
income, both of which are based on an escrow agreement. If the
trust, or its adviser, receives the funds in escrow under an agree-
ment whereby the funds do not belong to the trust unless and until
the loan is accepted and the borrower decides not to close, the
position that the deposit or fee constitutes gross income should be
severely weakened during the interim before the borrower opts to
withdraw. A second alternative is available to those trusts using
advisory companies as originating agents for loans. In this situa-
tion, the adviser would receive the escrow deposit (not as agent for
the trust). In the event of a failure to close, the adviser could keep
this amount as part of its compensation thereby avoiding any sub-
83. Rev. Rul. 70-362, 1970-2 Cum. BULL. 147. The position of the Service is that these
fees represent payment for a service rendered by the trust. Consequently, under § 1.856-
2(c)(2)(ii) of the regulations these are "fees imposed upon a borrower which are in fact a
charge for services in addition to the charge for the use of borrowed money" and therefore
not "good" interest.
84. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(2) and (a)(3).
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stantial question of gross income to the trust.
As is the normal case when a bank or other institution lends
money, a borrower from a REIT will more often than not be
expected to pay directly or reimburse the trust for various expendi-
tures incurred in processing the loan and analyzing both the prop-
erty involved and the credit status of the borrower such as legal,
credit inspection and similar fees. If the trust charges the borrower
directly for these "services", "bad" income subject to exclusion
results. If the borrower pays these items indirectly, it is apparently
the Service's position that these amounts will not be income subject
to exclusion.8 5 This would extend to the cost of all items which
could be said to reasonably constitute conditions precedent to the
trust's obligation to lend.
With respect to counsel fees a more substantial problem exists.
In order to justify a borrower's payment of expenses, the particular
expense in question must be related to services performed for the
borrower to enable him to qualify for the loan. If, as is the normal
case, the trust is requiring the borrower to pay for services of the
trust's counsel in preparing papers and the like, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to argue that such counsel is really representing the
borrower. As a consequence, the question of income to the trust
becomes inevitable. To resolve this difficulty, it is suggested that
the trust factor these costs into its determination of the stated rate
of interest or the number of points charged.8 Rendered as a part
of interest or points, the trust should have qualifying 75 percent
test interest.
3. 30 Percent Income Test
Despite the fact that a trust fits within the income boundaries
established by the 75 percent and 90 percent tests, it must still
satisfy a negative test if it is to qualify. Section 856(c)(4) imposes
a further restriction on the securities gains which qualify for the
90 percent test 7 and the real property disposition profits which fit
within the 75 percent test.88 Not more than 30 percent of the trust's
gross income may be derived from real property dispositions and
short-term capital gains. While the implication of this section is
85. Olienses, Real Estate Investment Trusts - Problems and Opportunities, PRACTICING
LAW INSTITUTE: TRANSCRIPT SERIES, REAL ESTATE LAW AND PRACTICE, No. 17 (1973) at
27.
86. Id.
87. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(2)(D).
88. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(3)(C).
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that long-term capital gains will always meet the 90 percent and
30 percent tests, and that long-term capital gains arising from real
property held for four years or more will always meet the 75 per-
cent and 30 percent tests, it must be emphasized that these income
tests are quantitative tests. If any of the income items involved in
the 30 percent test are attributable to property held "primarily for
sale","9 immediate and total disqualification occurs."
II. TAXATION OF REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND THEIR
SHAREHOLDERS
If a trust meets the definitional requirements of section 856, it
will be taxed as a real estate investment trust if it distributes 90
percent or more of its "real estate investment trust taxable in-
come" for the taxable year. t
A. Real Estate Investment Trust Taxable Income
Section 857(b)(2) of the Code defines "real estate investment
trust taxable income" as the taxable income" of the trust, adjusted
as follows:
(1) reduced by any excess of net long-term capital gains over
net short-term capital losses;
(2) increased by any deductions for dividends received, divi-
dends paid,94 tax-exempt interest and the capital gains portion of
the dividends paid deduction of section 561, all of which would
otherwise be used in computing taxable income;
(3) increased by any net operating loss deduction 5 used in
computing taxable income; and
(4) computed without regard to the change of accounting pe-
riod computation provided in section 443(b). In effect, the Code
directs computation of taxable income as a corporation, increased
or reduced by the items listed in (1) through (4) above.
89. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(4).
90. For a discussion of alternatives to this disqualification effect ("sudden death") see
Carroll, Tax Policy for the Real Estate Investment Trusts, 28 TAX L. REV. 299 (1973).
91. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(a)(1).
92. "Taxable income" is defined in § 63 of the Code as gross income, minus allowable
deductions.
93. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 243, 244 and 245.
94. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 247.
95. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172. As a result of this denial of the net operating loss
deduction, it is not uncommon for a trust in its earlier, loss-producing stage, to consciously
avoid qualifying under §§ 856-858 to permit use of these losses.
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B. 90 Percent Distribution Requirements
After computing the real estate investment trust taxable in-
come for the taxable year, a further adjustment is required to
determine what amount must be distributed to shareholders. Sec-
tion 857(b)(2)(C) requires that taxable income be reduced for ordi-
nary income dividends paid to shareholders. Section 857(a)(1) pro-
vides that this deduction must equal 90 percent or more of the
trust's real estate investment trust taxable income prior to taking
that deduction into account. Consequently, in determining whether
a trust qualifies because it has, in addition to satisfying the section
856 definitions, distributed 90 percent or more of its real estate
investment trust taxable income, one must first compute taxable
income, increase it by the dividends paid deduction and then apply
the 90 percent distribution test to that adjusted figure. For exam-
ple, if the real estate investment trust taxable income of Trust A,
computed under section 856(b)(2), were $1,000,000 and the section
856(b)(2)(C) deductions were $4,000,000, the trust would not have
satisfied the 90 percent distribution test since it would have only
distributed 80 percent of the adjusted figure. Alternatively, if the
section 856(b)(2)(C) deduction were $9,000,000, the distribution
test would have been satisfied." For purposes of determining how
much must be distributed to assure compliance with this 90 percent
distribution test, the trust should take the position that any doubt-
ful income item is income and any doubtful deduction item is not
allowable. The reason for this approach (which at first blush ap-
pears almost disloyal) is that an agent, upon a subsequent audit,
will not be concerned with the fact that a trust believed that the
90 percent test was satisfied. If, because of additional income inclu-
sions or deduction disallowances on audit, 90 percent was not in
fact distributed, the trust is disqualified. This disqualification oc-
curs despite the fact that the test may be failed by an insignificant
amount."
96. Real estate investment trust taxable income of $1,000,000 (@ 857(b)(2)), increased
by $4,000,000 (the dividends paid deduction of § 857(b)(2)(C)) is $5,000,000.
97. Real estate investment trust taxable income of $1,000,000 (§ 857(b)(2)), increased
by $9,000,000 (the dividends paid deduction of § 857(b)(2)(C)) is $10,000,000.
98. The problem can be simply illustrated. Assume a trust with gross income (all
ordinary income) of $10,000,000 and deductions (other than the dividends paid deduction)
of $8,000,000. The trust's taxable income for purposes of 90 % distribution test in $2,000,000
out of which $1,800,000 must be distributed. If the trust adheres literally to the requirement
and distributes $1,800,000 it has mbt the test - at least for the time being. Assume further
that on a subsequent audit the useful life for a particular item of depreciable property is
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A partially effective safety valve is created by section 858. Due
to the difficulty of accurately determining taxable income on the
last day of the taxable year, the Code allows a trust to elect to have
certain dividends paid after the close of the year treated as if paid
during the taxable year in question. This "spill-over" election is
permitted if the trust (1) declares the dividend prior to the time it
must file its return for the taxable year99 and (2) in fact distributes
such dividend within twelve months after the end of that taxable
year and not later than the date of payment of its first regular
quarterly dividend made after declaration of the "spill-over" divi-
dend. The effect of this section is to permit the trust to purchase a
limited amount of insurance by declaring a "spill-over" dividend,
thereby creating a cushion against the possibilities of disqualifica-
tion inherent in subsequent audit adjustments."'0
C. Income Taxation of the Real Estate Investment Trust
If a trust has satisfied both the definitional tests of section 856
and the distribution requirement of section 857(a)(1), it will
achieve the "pass-through" or "conduit" treatment intended by the
Congress. 10' The trust will be taxed as a corporation on the undis-
tributed portion of its real estate investment taxable income.102 In
addition, the trust is subject to a capital gains tax on the undistri-
buted excess of net long-term capital gains over net short-term
capital losses.'0 3 With respect to the treatment afforded distrib-
uted capital gains, it is important to realize that this result does
increased by one year from four to five years and that the deduction taken was $1,000. In
fact it should have been $800. The consequence is that taxable income is increased by $200
and the trust fails the test and is disqualified on the basis of this $180 under-distribution.
99. Under § 856(a)(1), this would include the period of any extension granted for the
filing of that return.
100. For a recent discussion of certain proposals of the American Bar Association and
the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts relating to this problem, see
Carroll, Tax Policy for the Real Estate Investment Trusts, 28 TAX L. REv. 299, 315-19
(1973). 1
101. The trust, once it is qualified, must affirmatively elect the benefits of the REIT
provisions of the Code. The election is made by computing its taxable income on its return
in accordance with § 857. Once the election is made, it is irrevocable for the year involved
and all succeeding taxable years. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(1), Treas. Reg. § 1.856-
2(b) (1962). To maintain qualified status, the trust must also meet certain record keeping
requirements relating to the actual ownership of its shares. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
857(a)(2), Treas. Reg. § 1.857-7 (1962).
102. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(b)(1); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11. In order to
satisfy the 90% distribution requirement, this will never exceed 10 % of taxable income
(excluding capital gains).
103. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(b)(3), Treas. Reg. § 1.857-2(b) (1962).
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not automatically accompany the distribution. The trust must af-
firmatively designate it as a capital gain dividend in a written
notice sent to its shareholders.'" 4
D. Taxation of Shareholders of Real Estate Investment Trusts
Once a trust has qualified and elected REIT treatment the
shareholders are taxed as follows:'0 5
(1) to the extent of the trust's earnings and profits,' REIT
ordinary income distributions to shareholders are ordinary divi-
dends;
(2) capital gains distributions retain their character and are
treated as gains from the sale of capital assets held for more than
six months;
(3) the $100 dividend received exclusion' is not available to
individual shareholders; and
(4) the 85 per cent dividend received deduction' is not avail-
able to corporate shareholders.
By this method, the object of treating the shareholders of the
trust in substantially the same way as direct owners of real estate
is accomplished.' 0'
III. CONCLUSION
Although part of the Code for almost thirteen years, the full
meaning of each of the provisions of sections 856 - 858 is far from
totally revealed. Counsel to a trust must necessarily rely on the
general outline furnished by the Code and regulations. Whatever
detail has been added by published rulings does not even come
close to filling in the blanks. Consequently, much of what becomes
part of a REIT's operating blueprint results from a decision to
avoid the risk of disqualification, despite the inevitable loss of
104. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(b)(3)(C), Treas. Reg. § 1.857-4(e) (1962). This
notice must be mailed within 20 days after the end of the trust's taxable year.
105. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 857, Treas. Reg. § 1.8574 (1962).
106. Treas. Reg. § 1.8574(a) (1962). The earnings and profits of a qualified and electing
REIT are computed somewhat differently from that of an ordinary corporation. Any deduc-
tion not permitted in reaching real estate investment trust taxable income is also barred in
computing current earnings and profits. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 857(d). For example,
if a trust had a net capital loss during a particular year, that loss would not be taken into
account and hence would not reduce earnings and profits.
107. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(c).
108. Id.
109. In substance, this pass-through result extends to tax preference items of the trust.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 58(0.
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potentially successful investment opportunities. Hopefully the
Treasury will see fit, in the not too distant future, to develop and
publish its solutions to at least some of the many unanswered
questions.
